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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes a new conceptual approach to the issue of Internet Service 
Intermediaries’ (ISIs) liability by classifying these agents into Authority Gatekeepers and 
Micro-Gatekeepers. This classification aims to give a better understanding of ISIs role on 
the new online chain of communication and their responsibility for harmful content created 
by third parties. This paper analyses from a critical perspective how legal sources have 
addressed the liability of one type of ISIs, Platform Networked Providers (PNP) such as 
Facebook, for harmful digital communications and proposes a new way to deal with this 
problem in order to balance Freedom of Expression and effectively deterring harmful 
speech.   
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I Introduction 
 
Over the last number of years there has been a critical shift in the way information is 
communicated to (and between) individuals.1 Before the Internet was easily accessed, 
content and speech was moderated by the traditional “gatekeepers”, a centralized collection 
that had the ability to moderate content and decide what shall be published and what should 
not, for instance; publishers, broadcasters, newspapers, among others. The internet and its 
agents have been replacing these centralized gatekeepers conceptually changing the 
communication chain.    
 
The new decentralization and democratization of speech facilitated by the Internet, is 
achieved by allowing individuals not only to be creators of the information but to be 
gatekeepers as well. A new chain of online communication is composed by the author. The 
infrastructure provider (Authority Gatekeepers), the platform (Authority gatekeepers), 
small intermediary (Micro-Gatekeepers e.g. Facebook Page Administrator) and finally the 
receptor who can be a creator of speech as well. This paradigm is feasible in part due to the 
functionalities of Participative Networked Platform (e.g. Facebook).This paper deals only 
with Participative Network Platform that host user-generated content online.  
 
Although this paradigm is fructiferous for democracy because it allows a high participation 
of individuals in political and social speech2, in jurisdictions around the world (including 
New Zealand), there is a growing concern about harm in Cyberspace. Legal threats online 
is a wide-ranging topic, elongating into different areas of law, from defamation to copyright 
infringement3. One of the hardest challenges for legal sources when addressing these issues 
is to detect who was liable for the harmful content.  
 
The root of these issues is the incapability of law to outpace the technology innovations. In 
other words, legal sources have failed to translate the reality behind technology into legal 
  
1 See Jürgen Habermas “Political Communication in media society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an Epistemic 
Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research” (2006) 16 CT 411 at 423. 
2 See also Emily Laidlaw “Internet Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Social Responsibilities” 
(Doctor of Philosophy thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2012) at 25. Retrievable 
from <http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/317/> 
3 Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: The Adequacy of the Current Sanctions and Remedies 
(NZLC SP23534, 2012) at 1. 
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grounds in order to know who is responsible for harmful content. This paper will addresses 
exclusively harmful contend uploaded by third parties. 
 
In an attempt to catch up with technology, jurisdictions have enacted “digital bills” to 
address specifically issues on the Internet such as harmful content. For instance, In New 
Zealand, the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015, has been enacted to deter online 
content that can lead to cyber bullying, defamation, hateful speech and blasphemy among 
others. But, how effective is this legislation depends on how accurate to technology 
dynamics it is.  As stated above and to illustrate, in terms of liability a Facebook page hosts 
is not the same as Facebook the platform. Despite how much impact this differentiation 
may have, it has not been taken into account by law makers or case law in New Zealand.  
 
This paper proposes a new way to understand the role of every agent in the chain of 
communication by applying the sociological theory of the “Network Gatekeeping” 
proposed by Barzilai-Nahon4. This theory proposed that ISIs are classified in Authority 
Gatekeepers and Micro-Gatekeepers5. Although it is a novel way to analyse the 
participation of agents over the Internet it leads to a better and more accurate understanding 
of liability for harmful content uploaded by third parties.  
 
This paper is delivered in four main sections: The first section explores the concept of 
Internet Services Intermediaries (ISI) and their role as gatekeepers of information from a 
sociological point of view. The second section is a comparative study between Europe and 
New Zealand regarding the liability model for ISIs. This section comprehends an analysis 
of the legislation and case law. This paper concludes that in order to design an effective 
framework, law makers should take into account the conceptual differences between ISIs. 
A Scope of this Paper. 
 
Due to the multiple classification of ISIs, this paper focuses on Participative Networked 
platforms explained below. Additionally limits its scope to harmful content uploaded by 
third parties. It leaves aside for a posterior debate other concerns such as copyrights 
infringement, privacy breaches and other law proscriptions.  
 
  
4 See Karine Barzilai-Nahon “Toward a Theory of Network Gatekeeping: A Framework for Exploring 
Information Control” (2008) 59 JAmSocInfSci 1493. 
5 Laidlaw, above n 2, at 59.  
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II Internet Services Intermediaries as Gatekeepers of the Information Flow. 
 
This section explores from a sociological perspective how ISIs have changed the chain of 
communication and why these changes are important when studying liability for harmful 
communication. First it explores, the concept of gatekeepers before the internet, the role of 
ISIs as Gatekeepers, specifically Participative Networked Platforms and third the 
implications in the analysis of liability.  
A Gatekeepers in an Online World : Basic Concepts 
 
Gatekeepers of information and their role in democracies is an obligatory theme of study 
when referring to both, the right of Freedom of Expression and ISIs’ Liability. This is 
because, they exercise censorship to a certain degree on individuals’ speech. First of all, at 
a general level gatekeepers are entities that exercise information control by, “selecting 
which information to publish, or channelling information through a channel, or deleting 
information by removing it, or shaping information into a particular form”6.  The traditional 
concept of gatekeepers was studied by literature of Information Science before the 
penetration of the Internet into the average household. Management, Sociology and 
Communication discussed how some agents can decided what information shall or not 
reach certain audiences7. For instance, from the communication research perspective, 
“gatekeepers” were agents who control what information was distributed such as stores, 
publishing houses, censors, newspaper editors, financial brokers, even national 
governments8.  
 
Traditional Gatekeepers have been gradually replaced by new actors online, the so called 
ISIs. ISIs in the most generic way are those entities providing services that enable 
individuals to receive or impart information on the Internet9. These new Gatekeepers have 
changed profoundly the chain of communication, but these changes are explored below.  
 
  
6 “In sociology literature gatekeepers this are those who guard and preserve a community’s information”: 
Barzilai-Nahon, above n 4, at 1493. 
7 At 1494 
8 See, John Perry Barlow “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” (8 February 1996) Electronic 
Frontier Foundation  <https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html>  
9 Nicolo Zingales “The Brazilian approach to internet intermediary liability: blueprint for a global regime? 
Internet Policy Review” (2015).  4 IPR 1  at 2 < http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/brazilian-approach-
internet-intermediary-liability-blueprint-global-regime>. 
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According to the OECD, ISIs role is to “provide the Internet‘s basic infrastructure and 
platforms by enabling communications and transactions between third parties as well as 
applications and services”10. Additionally, they “give access to, host, transmit and index 
content originated by third parties or provide Internet-based services to third parties”11. 
There are two main categories of ISIs12. 1. Dumb pipes: These are “meant to signify Internet 
access providers, which provide subscribers with a data connection allowing access to the 
Internet through physical transport infrastructure”13 (e.g. Vodafone). This are classified as 
“mere conduits” or dumb pipes because they just provide the infrastructure. The second is 
the “content based intermediaries” “whose business model depends on the publication of 
“quality” content” 14 (e.g. Facebook and Yahoo).  This ISIS are categorized in the next 
diagram according to their technology architecture15.   
Diagram 1. Classification of ISIs according to their technology features.   
 
  
10 OECD “Economic and Social Role of Internet Intermediaries” (April 2010), available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments> At 9. 
11 At 9. 
12 Zingales, above n 9,  at 3. 
13 OECD, above n 10, at 11. 
14 Zingales, above n 9,  at 3.  
15 This classification is a mixture based on the OECD model. At [9-14]. 
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This paper focuses only on Participative networked Platforms which can be seen in the 
Diagram 1 as part of the category “Content Based Intermediaries”.   The OECD established 
the concept of Participative Networked platforms as: 
 
Services based on new technologies such as the web, instant messaging, or mobile 
technologies that enable users to contribute to developing, rating, collaborating and 
distributing Internet content and developing and customising Internet applications, or 
to conduct social networking. This category is intended to include social networking 
sites, video content sites, online gaming websites and virtual worlds16. 
 
The OECD breaks down the list of ISIs into categories according to their functionality. 
Among the listed are Facebook and Twitter which have a large user base. 
Diagram 2: Classification of Participative Networked Platforms 
 
 
1 ISIs and their impact in the chain of communication: a Democracy matter. 
 
Before narrowing this study to Participative Networked Platforms, it is necessary establish 
a few points. First of all, “content based” ISIs (including Participative networked Platforms) 
have disrupted the traditional chain of communication and therefore have impacted 
profoundly the right of Freedom of expression and the democracy paradigm itself. The 
transformations relevant for this study are three: 
  
16 OECD, Above n 10, at 14. 
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(a) Democratization of the Speech:  
 
Balkin established that “a democratic culture is a culture in which individuals have a fair 
opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as 
individuals”17. Therefore the more access to participation channel individuals have, the 
more democratization of  speech there is in a society. The Internet then, opened spaces to 
creators of the speech to reach larger audiences, and for audiences to become in authors of 
information as well (See Diagram 4). The democratization of the chain of communication 
occurs when there is a common and open protocol used to facilitate direct communication 
between all users or “ends” connected18. For example, the opportunity that Internet users 
have to create blogs to upload information, or Facebook pages to group individuals with 
the same interest. At the same time, new interactive forums give the possibility to audiences 
to participate and reply to the original message.  
 
(b)  Decentralization: More Gatekeepers than before, 
  
The centralized model refers to traditional media intermediaries (e.g. Newspaper or 
Television Channel), who were in a position to highlight preferred content and suppress or 
ignore unpopular points of view19. In contrast with these traditional communication models 
(see Diagram 3) which has a few noticeable gatekeepers, “Internet communication was 
based on a peer model”20. The power of censorship of the speech is no longer held by a few 
but a large number of internet agents. “Between every user of the internet and the content 
being accessed are numerous actors involved in the process of bringing to the user the 
desired content”21 (see Diagram 4). “[E]ach of these actors through which a user can access 
content on the internet is an intermediary”22 thus a gatekeeper. For instance, the creator of 
the blog, the author of the Yahoo forum or the Facebook page host. These actors are not 
anymore large media companies, they are individuals who are internet users at the same 
time.  
 
  
17 Jack Balkin "Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information 
society" (2004) 79 NYULRev 1 at 3. 
18 Oren Bracha and  Frank A Pasquale "Federal search commission? Access, fairness and accountability in 
the law of search." (2008) 93 CornellLRev 1149 at 1156 
19 At 1156. 
20 At 1157.  
21Bailey Rishab “Censoring the Internet: The New Intermediary Guidelines”(2012) February  EconPolitWkly 
1 at 1. 
22 At 1.  
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(c) More Gatekeepers more information control. 
 
“An intermediary can theoretically exercise control over the flow of content, possibly 
making it more efficient for them to deal with instances of offending material”23 . ISIs, as 
gatekeepers, are often seen as the agent who control the online content. "This is because 
they are in a position to eliminate access to objectionable material and, quite often, to 
identify wrongdoers”24.  To summarise, the next two diagrams depict how the traditional 
and new chain of communication are structured taking into account all the three 
characteristics:  
Diagram 3: Traditional Chain of Communication: 
 
 
Diagram 4: Online Communication of the Speech:  
 
 
  
23 At 1.  
24 Etienne Montero and Quentin Van Enis “Enabling freedom of expression in light of filtering measures 
imposed on Internet intermediaries: Squaring the circle?” (2011) 27 CLSRev 21 at 21. 
Newspapers 
Television 
Radio 
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B Layers of Gatekeeping: From Macro, micro-gatekeeper and Authority-gatekeeper.  
Another taxonomy of ISIs is explained by Emily Laidlaw who took the theory of gatekeepers 
proposed by Barzilai-Nahon to differentiate ISIs. “Laidlaw suggests that the human rights 
obligations of Internet intermediaries should increase according to the extent that their 
activities facilitate or impact democratic culture”25. This categorization seems to be adopted 
by the European Commission who quoted Laidlaw: “A distinction is made between Micro-
Gatekeepers (certain content moderators), authority gatekeepers (Facebook, Wikipedia, 
portals), and Authority Gatekeepers (Internet Service Providers)”.26 As stated above, 
Authority Gatekeepers are out of the scope of this research. The focus then is Micro-
Gatekeepers and Authority gatekeepers. The next diagram is an illustration of the new chain 
of communication based on the Laidlaw classification. 
 
Diagram 5: Authority gatekeepers and Micro-Gatekeepers 
 
 
 
 
  
25 European Commission Report on factors which enable or hinder the protection of human rights at 50 (2014) 
retrievable from < http://www.fp7-frame.eu/wp-content/materiale/reports/03-Deliverable-2.1.pdf> 
26 Laidlaw, above n 2, at 59. Cited by European Commission, above n 25, at 154. 
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This classification is just illustrative, and this paper is of the opinion that more sociological 
research is required to establish categories of ISIs, additionally, it is difficult to strictly 
categorize agents in a dynamic environment as The Internet is. As Bracha Commented “the 
technological structure of the Internet is not static. Technology is a plastic medium, open 
to a broad range of reshaping, entailing various patterns and degrees of control.”27 
Therefore, there are agents that initiate their online life as Micro-Gatekeepers, but according 
to Laidlaw their democratic impact is so high that they turn into Authority-gatekeeper. 
Laidlaw exemplified this with the case of Huffington Post, “which discursive significance, 
has moved it up a level from a micro-IIG to be an authority gatekeeper”28. However, some 
generalisations are feasible, for example Facebook is an Authority Gatekeeper and it is 
difficult to foresee this changing29.  
 
Applying these concepts to the scope of this paper, which is Participative Networked 
Platforms it can be concluded that service providers as Facebook, would be “Authority 
Gatekeepers”. These entities are “intermediaries that have become household names and 
the functions they serve have become iconic representations of Web”30. For instance, 
LinkedIn and professional networking, YouTube, Wikipedia and general knowledge, 
Twitter and microblogging among others.31  These entities have legal and economic 
machinery and above all, they are visible32. For this reason, regulators turn their eyes to 
them when dealing with liability how will be explained in the next section. 
 
Users, on the other hand are individuals or companies who decide to use online spaces of 
expression. These are “Micro-Gatekeepers” for instance “the administrator sites such as 
application and content moderators, and network administrators”33.  They are not always 
visible. Authors of the content are at the beginning of the chain and are difficult to identify 
and therefore difficult to control34.  
  
27 Bracha and  Pasquale, above n 18, at 1162 
28 Laidlaw, above n 2, at 62. 
29 “Some of them started out in small capacities with no obligations and then meteorically shot to the level of 
authority gatekeeper attracting human rights obligations such as Facebook” : Laidlaw, above n 2, at 60. 
30 See Corey Omer "Intermediary Liability For Harmful Speech: Lessons From Abroad"(2014)28HarvJ.L.& 
Tech. 287 at 294. 
31 At 294. 
32 “traditional media intermediaries, the giant intermediaries are likely to maintain significantly superior 
salience and exposure, both on and off the Internet.”: Bracha and  Pasquale, above n 18, at 1160 
33Laidlaw, above n 2, at 60. 
34 At 60. 
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Thanks to decentralization of the Internet, everybody with basic knowledge of computer 
usage, can spread content online. In The United States alone, “every minute YouTube user’s 
upload 100 hours of new video, 25 Instagram users share over 41,000 new photos, Twitter 
users tweet over 347,000 times, and Facebook users update 293,000 statuses”35. This 
paradigm is troublesome to government and regulators who are unable to penalize the 
offender in a sea of anonymity.  
 
III Liability of Gatekeepers: Participative Networked Platforms.   
 
This section deals with liability of Authority Gatekeepers and Micro-Gatekeepers, 
specifically within the category of Participative Networked Platforms. As is seen from the 
next diagram. 
 
Diagram 6: Layers of gatekeepers applied specifically to Participative Networked 
Platforms 
 
  
 
  
35 Omer, above n 30, at 298. 
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When liability is discussed the above taxonomic discussion gains importance. The 
responsibility of an Authority Gatekeeper such as Twitter, should not be equitable to the 
liability of the Micro-gatekeeper as a Facebook Page Host although both of them are ISIs. 
The proposal of this paper is that to construct an effective ISIs’ liability framework, legal 
sources should take into account the digital reality, by differencing Authority gatekeeper 
from Micro-Gatekeepers. At this point it is necessary to emphasize, that the heart of the 
matter when dealing with liability of ISIs is detect who is responsible for the harmful 
content? As summarized by Professor Susan Corbett:  
 
Clearly an individual who posts defamatory material online is liable as a publisher; but 
should an online intermediary such as an internet service provider (ISP), the owner of 
a blog or website, or a search engine provider, who has facilitated the original posting 
or its further dissemination, also be liable?36. 
 
ISIs’ liability with its complex chain of communication has been dealt with differently in 
New Zealand as appose to Europe. This will be explored further in this section.   
A Legislation: The Vertical and Horizontal Approach (Europe and New Zealand) 
 
There are two legislative approaches to ISIs’ Liability, Horizontal and Vertical. The 
horizontal approach is applied in Europe37 through the E-commerce Directive38.  This 
approach differentiates between the classes and functions of ISIs for the purpose of 
limitation of liability”39 and addresses all the issues in a single piece of legislation. The E-
Commerce Directive regime is described in detail below. It should be noted that in recent 
years the European Commission engaged in consultation with the public on reform to the 
  
36 Susan Corbett “Search Engines and the Automated Process: Is a Search Engine Provider 'a Publisher' of 
Defamatory Material?” (2014) 20 NZBLQ 200 Retrievable from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2461499 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2461499>. 
37  Lilian Edwards "Role and responsibility of the internet intermediaries in the field of copyright and related 
rights" (Presented at conference in June 2011 before governmental and Industry Representatives, 
Commissioned by World Intellectual Property Organization, Geneva, 2011) at 7  Retrievable from 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/doc/role_and_responsibility_of_the_internet_intermed
iaries_final.pdf >. 
38 Directive 2000/31/EC on Certain legal aspects of information society services in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce') [2000] OJ L178, art [12-15].  
39 Jyoti  Panday "Comparative Study Of Intermediary Liability Regimes Chile, Canada, India, South Korea, 
UK and USA in support of the Manila Principles On Intermediary Liability"(1 July 2015) Manila Principles 
<www.Manilaprinciples.org> at 10.  
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Directive including arts 12 to 1540 . On the other hand, the vertical approach “lays down 
rules for special domains (copyright, protection of children, personal data, counterfeiting, 
domain names, online gambling among others)”41. For example, “US Internet gambling 
law, the Defamation Act 1996, and the United States and its Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act of 1998”42. In the case of New Zealand, The Harmful Digital Communications Act 
refers to separate frameworks for matters different from harmful communication (e.g. 
Copyrights issues are remitted to the Copyright Act 1994)43. This approach does not 
differentiate between types of ISIs44.  The next diagram illustrates the basic differences. 
Diagram 7: Legislative Approaches to ISIs’ Liability  
 
 
  
40 See “Public consultation on the future of electronic commerce in the internal market and the implementation 
of the Directive on electronic commerce (2000/31/EC)”, closed November 5 2010, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2010/e-commerce_en.htm.> 
41 Edwards, above n 37, at 7. 
42 See At 7. 
43 The Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015, s 25 (4).   
44 See Pablo Asbo Baistrocchit "Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on Electronic 
Commerce" (2002 ) 19 SantaClaraComputer&HighTechLJ 111 at 117. 
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As seen from Diagram 7, both of these approaches provide Safe harbour for ISIs. Before 
going further with each jurisdictional approach it is necessary to establish what “safe 
harbour ” means in the context of ISIs’ liability.  
1 Safe harbours in legislations.  
 
This system is “a legally safe place that is given to Internet intermediaries meaning that 
provided their actions follow carefully the procedure, they will not be liable for user 
actions”45. This immunity from liability, under certain restrictions, is a good strategic 
development which supports the emergence of innovative services and freedom of 
expression46. In the United States for example, the Communications Decency Act Section 
230(c) (2) was one of the first legislative bills around the world in recognizing this system. 
It set out that Intermediaries cannot be held liable for self-policing, restricting access to, or 
providing others the technical means to restrict access to material considered 
objectionable47. Below this paper explains the legislative approach to ISIs’ liability and safe 
harbour systems in each jurisdiction.  
2 Europe Legislation. 
(a)The Online Conduct Code. 
 
After recent terrorists attacks in Brussels,48 the European Union called on all the Authority 
Gatekeepers, Facebook, Microsoft*, Twitter and YouTube to collaborate to deter Hateful 
speech49. By signing an “Online Conduct Code” these companies show their support to the 
European Commission and EU Member States for “the challenge of ensuring that online 
platforms do not offer opportunities for illegal online hate speech”50. One of the conducts 
that Authority Gatekeepers agreed to by signing the Online Conduct Code is “to review the 
  
45 Zingales, above n 9. 
46 See  Article 19 “Internet intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability” (2013) < www.article19.org> 
47 Communication Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (1996). 
48  “Three men walked into the departure lounge at Brussels' Zaventem airport shortly after 8.30am local time 
– 7.30am in London. The two blasts ripped through the building, leaving at 11 people dead and dozens injured. 
10 are in a critical condition (…) Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) has already claimed responsibility 
for the attacks” : Peter Foster “What happened in Brussels?”  The Telegraph UK (Online Ed, London, 22 
March 2016) retrievable from < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news>. 
49 Commission Press Release “European Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct on 
Illegal online hate speech” IP/16/1937 (31 May 2016). 
50 Commission of The European Communities Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online 
(2016) Retrievable from <http://ec.europa.eu >. 
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majority of valid notifications for removal of illegal hate speech in less than 24 hours and 
remove or disable access to such content, if necessary”51. Additionally, the IT Companies 
pledge themselves “to educate and raise awareness with their users about the types of 
content not permitted under their rules and community guidelines”. By creating this code, 
the European Communities implicitly recognized the importance of Authority Gate-keepers 
as important stakeholders in society. This is because these companies have the 
technological tools to utilise different, traditionally government, powers in the online world 
such as controlling an individual’s speech.  
 
Some communities are already speaking out against the code. One of the major aspects of 
disagreement relates to the fact that effectively the Code recognises, it is companies who 
are taking the lead on deterring illegal hate speech online. But “in a society based on the 
rule of law, private companies should not take the lead in law enforcement otherwise this 
leads to arbitrary censorship of our communications”52. On a positive note, the Code 
engages Authority Gatekeepers to prevent harmful communications by educating their 
users.  This is not a disempowerment of the government but more of a collaborative effort. 
This feature is a very Avant-garde approach because it places responsibilities on the agents 
who are capable to assume them, recognising the reality of technology today. 
(b) The E-commerce Directive: Passive reactive Safe harbour s? 
 
Europe holds a horizontal approach which does differentiate between ISIs. It has one piece 
of legislation to address all the possible issues independent of the exact subject. Article 12 
establishes the “safe harbour” for ISIs by dividing these entities into three types according 
to their activity: (i) mere conduit53, (ii) caching54, and (iii) hosting55. ISIs “acting as mere 
conduits are protected from liability potentially arising from transmitted content, provided 
that they are only passively involved in the transmission”. Caching is the temporary storage 
of information, “while hosting providers store third-party content for a potentially indefinite 
period of time”56.  
 
  
51 At 2.  
52 Joe  McNamee “Guide to the Code of Conduct on Hate Speech” (3 June 2016)  EDRi <https://edri.org> 
53 Directive 2000/31/EC, above n 38, art 12.  
54 Art 13 
55 Art 14 
56 Mlynar Vojtech "A Storm in ISP Safe Harbour Provisions: The Shift From Requiring Passive-Reactive to 
Active-Preventative Behavior and Back" ( 2014) 19 IntellPropLBull 1 at 7. 
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The “safe harbour” for every ISI is different but they have common ground. The common 
ground is the notion of “actual knowledge” of the offensive material. ISIs are protected 
from liability in two circumstances: The ISI “does not have actual knowledge of illegal 
activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity is apparent"57; or the ISI “upon obtaining such 
knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disrupt access of the 
information”58.The ISI must not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or infringing 
information otherwise it would be liable.  Additionally, under the Directive ISIs “cannot be 
required to perform general monitoring of content passing through their systems. Instead, 
they typically follow a notice-and takedown procedure when dealing with infringing 
activities”59.  This illustrates the EU's intention for ISIs “to remain passive-reactive. As 
long as intermediaries act passively and neutrally by automatically caching data without 
monitoring its content”60. 
(c) Human Rights Framework: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.   
 
In recent case of Barbulescu v Romania addressed by the European Court of Human 
Rights61 the dissenting Judge Pablo Pinto de Albuquerque established that “user-generated 
expressive activity on the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of 
freedom of expression”.  He also established that: 
  
States have a positive obligation to promote and facilitate universal Internet access, 
including the creation of the infrastructure necessary for Internet connectivity. In the 
case of private communications on the Internet, the obligation to promote freedom of 
expression is coupled with the obligation to protect the right to respect for private life62. 
 
ISIs and more specifically participative networked Platforms are an important tool of 
internet connectivity, therefore their use is covered by this framework. In other words, 
  
57 Art 14. 
58 Art 12 ; see also Benoît Frydman and Isabelle Rorive “Regulating Internet Content Through Intermediaries 
in Europe and the USA, Zeitschrift fur Rechtssoziologie” (2002) 23 HEFT41 
59 Vojtech, above n 56, at 8. 
60 At 12. 
61 Bărbulescu v. Romania (2016)13 EHRR 29 (Section IV, ECHR) at 28 per Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
dissenting at [3]. 
62 At [3] 
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individuals use Participative Networked Platforms because they have the right of freedom 
of expression. First of all, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)63 guarantees the right to freedom of expression in the following terms: “this right 
includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers64.This is complimented 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Article 10 establishes that “this Article shall not prevent States from requiring 
the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises”65. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) elaborates upon and gives legal force to 
many of the rights articulated in the UDHR66. Article 19 of the ICCPR67 states that: “(…) 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, (…) in the form of art or through any other media of his choice”68. 
 
Therefore, Freedom of expression comprehends others dimensions of speech. Not only the 
right of individuals to express themselves but also to access an online world of information. 
ISIs offer the technological tools and platforms to individuals to achieve these purposes. 
The OECD recognised the significance of Participative networked platforms by 
establishing that: 
 
 Never before have had so many people introduced so many kinds of content, on such 
a broad scale, and potentially with such wide-ranging impacts. Changes in the way 
users produce, distribute, access and re-use information, knowledge and entertainment 
are likely to continue to have structural impacts on the cultural, social and political 
spheres.69 
 
The recognition provided by the above statement illustrates a true realization of Freedom 
of expression that the ISIs now provide. The council of the OECD recognised that 
“appropriate limitation of liability for Internet intermediaries plays a fundamental role in 
  
63 Universal Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217A, III A/Rcs/801 (1948), art 19. 
64  Art 19. 
65 European Convention on Human Rights 213 UNTS 221 (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered 
into force 3 September 1953) art 10. 
66 Article 19, above n 46. 
67 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (opened for signature 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) [the ICCPR], art 19. 
68 Art 19. 
69 OECD, above n 10, At 43. 
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promoting innovation and creativity, the tree flow of information”70, in other words true 
freedom of expression. In fact, in response ISIs have built their defence from third party 
content liability. The section B of this title analyses one of the most iconic cases regarding 
Participative Networked Platforms (Delfi AS v Estonia71) that illustrates the use of freedom 
of expression as ISIs’ defence from Liability.  
3 New Zealand Legislation. 
 
New Zealand applies a vertical approach.  As in the United States, there is a separate piece 
of legislation to address every issue that could arise from ISIs’ liability. The scheme is 
constructed according to the rights which are affected (e.g. copyrights) rather than in the 
condition of the ISIs. This vertical approach is visible in the Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 201572 when it establishes that nothing in the ISIs’ liability section 
(s24 and s25) affects the following provisions: “section 211 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
2011; or section 19 of the Bail Act 2000; or copyright liability, or any proceedings, under 
the Copyright Act 1994”. 73  
(a)Harmful Digital Communication Act: The confusion between Authority 
Gatekeepers and Micro- Gatekeepers. 
 
The Harmful Digital Communication Act was enacted in 2015 and was intended to 
sufficiently comprehend Participative Networked Platforms. For instance, the Law 
Commission set out that Harmful communications as a concept not only applies: 
 
(…) to one-to-one communication but more broadly to the range of digital publishing 
which occurs in cyberspace. This includes the uploading of user generated content 
(audio-visual, pictures or text) on websites and platforms such as YouTube and 
Facebook, and the use of micro-blogging sites like Twitter to disseminate information 
and opinions.74 
 
  
70 “We recognised that the Internet allows people to give voice to their democratic aspirations, and any policy-
making associated with it must promote openness and be grounded in respect for human rights and the rule 
of law”:  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  Recommendation of the Council on 
Principles for Internet Policy Making (2011) Retrievable from  < http://acts.oecd.org> . 
71 Delfi AS v Estonia (64569/09) Grand Chamber  ECHR 16 June 15. 
72 The Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015. 
73 S 25: Or “any enactment that expressly overrides section 24”. 
74 Law Commission, above n 3, at [16]. 
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This legislation do not differentiate between Micro-Gatekeepers and Authority gatekeepers. 
Actually, all ISIs are grouped into one single concept: The concept of Internet Online Hosts. 
The Online Hosts are described by the act as “the person who has control over the part of 
the electronic retrieval system, such as a website or an online application, on which the 
communication is posted and accessible by the user”.75 Therefore, Both micro and 
Authority Gatekeepers could fall in this description. The consequence of this, is that Micro-
Gatekeepers such as Facebook Page Hosts must abide by the same Safe harbour rules as 
Authority Gatekeepers to benefit from the scheme. As highlighted below, when addressing 
case law, some Micro-Gatekeepers may be simple citizens and individuals that under this 
new Act must follow a reasonably complicated safe harbour scheme.  
 
The safe harbour  provisions in the HDCA are contained in s24 and 25: “No civil or criminal 
proceedings may be brought against an online content host in respect of the content 
complained of (the specific content) if the online content host (a) receives a notice of 
complaint about the specific content; and (b) complies with subsection 2”76. This concept 
does not include the scenario where the host did not receive a complaint. It begs the 
question, if a presumption of the intermediaries’ lack of knowledge would operate? Either 
way it appears the spirit of this legislation is that ISIs should not be responsible for third 
parties content that they did not acknowledge. 
 
 What s24 does do is set out that the fact an online content host does not take advantage of 
the Safe harbour, does not in itself (not taking advantage) create any civil or criminal 
liability for hosting the specific content. But if the intermediary follows the procedure it 
would have a “protection”, however section s24 does not make it clear what kind of 
protection is given or define the term “specific content”. Does this ambiguity mean that if 
a user found an entire page offensive it does not classify as “specific content”?  
 
The critical point this paper attempts to make is that law makers did not take into account 
the differences between ISIs when designing the safe harbour s scheme. Below, Diagram 8 
illustrates step by step the procedure that an “online host” has to follow in order to get the 
benefits from the safe harbour, as is seen from the image this scheme is rather complicated. 
As pointed out above, the scheme is based on the ISIs actual knowledge of the harmful 
communication, which is favourable, but the scheme still may be too complex to follow by 
some Micro-Gatekeepers. 
 
  
75 The Harmful Digital Communication Act, above n 43, s 4. 
76 S 25.   
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(i) A practical example of why the safe harbour (s) 25 is not effective to address 
liability of all type of ISIs: One size does not fit all. The Case of “Vic Deals”. 
 
 
A Facebook page works by facilitating an online space for users “to share their stories and 
connect with other people. Like profiles, a page can be customised by publishing stories, 
hosting events and more”77. Users (Any individual) can create a page and invite other users. 
They can control the content of the page. The tool available for users is called “the Settings 
tab”78 which has a lot of control over your page and the way your content appears. Users 
have general control for Page and Post visibility, for instance “who sees the Page and who 
can make changes to the Page”79.  
 
Moving to a prime example, there is a very popular Facebook Page in Wellington New 
Zealand called “Vic deals”80. The Host of this Page would be a Micro-Gatekeeper according 
to the definitions of Section II in this document. This page “was setup by marine biology 
student Carl Meyer, who arrived at Victoria University and thought noticeboards around 
campus were an inefficient way to advertise goods”81. This Facebook page has become so 
popular that by June 2016 it has more than 54,330 participants with the potential to host a 
very substantial number of post per day. Recently the Police have begun browsing this 
Facebook page because “it is has become popular for reporting crime, items that have been 
lost or found, and advertising flats.  More dubious posts include people asking for "420" – 
a codename for marijuana”82.  
 
 
 
  
77Facebook “How Do I Create a Page” (2016) Facebook, Inc. retrievable from <www.Facebook.com/help>  
78Facebook “Administrator tools” (2016) Facebook Inc. Retrievable from < 
https://www.facebook.com/business/learn/facebook-page-admin-tools> 
79 At 1. 
80 See Vic Deals page retrievable from < https://www.facebook.com/search/top/?q=vic%20deals> 
81 Samantha Whittle "Making a big deal of university students' needs" Dominion Post (Online ed, Auckland, 
April 9 2015) Retrievable from <http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-post/capital-life/capital 
day/67660102/making-a-big-deal-of-university-students-needs.html>.  
82 Tommy Livingston "Police keeping an eye on Vic Deals Facebook group" Dominion Post (Online ed, 
Auckland, January 12 2016) Retrievable from <http://www.stuff.co.nz/dominion-
post/news/74458344/police-keeping-an-eye-on-vic-deals-facebook-group>. 
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The police do not contact the administrator of the Facebook page (Carl Meyer) but it does 
monitor the website directly. Additionally, Meyer said that occasionally they get 
inappropriate posts, but these are usually deleted very quickly. “Members are able to report 
posts they think are inappropriate, which is a helpful feature of Facebook groups."83 
 
The above example indicates that Participative Networked Platforms are gaining relevance 
for authorities due to their impact on society. However, this fact begs the question, should 
users in democratic society be aware that they are being monitored by authorities in places 
of expression that are supposed to allow freedom of speech? Returning to the subject of the 
liability of the host, under the new Harmful Digital Communication Act, Carl Meyer as 
administrator of this page would not be liable for the illicit activities of users or for third 
party content in general. Unless users have reported the content to him and he failed to 
remove it. This is set out in s25 of the Act under the title “Process for obtaining protection 
against liability for specific content”.  The act established that “[n]o civil or criminal 
proceedings may be brought against an online content host in respect of the content 
complained of (the specific content)”84 as long as  “the online content host receives a notice 
of complaint about the specific content”85 and he proceeds to take it down.  
 
If Meyer does want to gain all the benefits from the safe harbour established in the Harmful 
Digital Communications Act he should follow a strict procedure as depicted in Diagram 8 
below.  It must be remembered that the safe harbour as designed in the act is an added help 
to ISIs looking to protect themselves against liability for third party content, and it is not 
mandatory. “The fact that an online content host does not take advantage of section 24 does 
not in itself create any civil or criminal liability for hosting the specific content”.86 
 
 
 
Diagram 8: Safe Harbour, Harmful Digital Communication Act.  
 
  
83  At 1. 
84 The Harmful Digital Act, above n 43, S 25. 
85 S 25.  
86 S 23. 
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As seen from the diagram above, the process to comply with the safe harbour scheme is 
complex. In cases that are similar to the Vic Deals example, where the host is just an 
individual with no legal background, the role of the authorities in effectively 
communicating this procedure is vital. The ideal situation envisaged would be one where 
Micro-Gatekeepers would have their own scheme. This would include measures that take 
into account that users are not always as powerful and full of resources as for example the 
Facebook or LinkedIn corporations. However as stated previously, the Act does not 
differentiate between online hosts, demonstrating that legal sources do not take into 
consideration the technological reality when enacting laws.   
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There are of course positive aspects of this legislation. There is the obligation of the host to 
ask the authors of the content to remove it themselves and even gives them an opportunity 
to express why they consider that it should not be removed87. For this the act gives an 
explicit length of time, 48 hours after the host received the complaint by the offended. This 
results in a reduction of the legal uncertainty during the Safe harbour process (e.g. How 
many days to take down the content among other issues), and secondly the safe guard of 
Freedom of Expression, because it provides the author of the speech the opportunity to 
defend his or her ideas. Recognising that simply because content offends someone does not 
make it ipso facto a Harmful Communication88. 
 
B Case Law: The cost of not differentiating Micro-Gatekeepers from Authority 
Gatekeepers. 
 
This section depicts the most iconic cases involving Participative Networked Platforms. As 
mentioned above, case law in New Zealand and Europe has failed to understand the true 
dynamics behind micro-gatekeeping. This has resulted in these entities being attributed 
obligations that may result in a freedom of expression restriction.  The source of this failure 
is that when it comes to online harmful communications, legal sources turn to defamation 
frameworks in other to resolve the liability of ISIs. Looking at it in this light would mean 
considering harmful communications to be “publications” making ISIs publishers, thus 
liable for the author’s message. The courts in both New Zealand and Europe have tried to 
resolve issues that arise from the Internet by applying analogies out of date which leads to 
legal inaccuracy and uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
  
87 S 24 [(b)-(d)]. 
88 “Not all harms arising from communications are proscribed by law. Criminal law has typically been 
concerned with protecting citizens from harmful communication which invokes fear for physical 
consequences, either personal or proprietary, or which are obscene or harmful to children. Civil law, in the 
past, also typically shied away from providing remedies for emotional harm as such. However, as 
demonstrated later, in both civil and criminal spheres the law has been moving towards recognition of, and 
protection from, emotional harm.”  Law Commission, above n 3, at [18].  
26                                                                    LIABILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES: 
Participative Networking Platforms and Harmful Content 
 
1 Europe Case law. 
(a) Delfi v Estonia. 
 
The landmark European Court of Human Rights judgment in Delfi AS v Estonia89 is an 
elevated standard of responsibility which was imposed on an online news portal for third 
parties content. In this case “The applicant is the owner of Delfi, an Internet news portal 
that publishes up to 330 news articles a day at the time of the lodging of the application”90. 
Some opinions would view Delfi as an Authority Gatekeeper due to its democratic impact 
and its economic and legal machinery. However there is a notable difference in that Delfi 
does not own the platform itself, like the “website domain” how Google does for example.  
 
“On the 24th of January 2006 an article with the title “SLK Destroyed Planned Ice Road” 
was published”91 on Delfi’s news portal. The article suggested that AS Saaremaa 
Laevakompanii (Saaremaa Shipping Company) made it impossible to use several ice roads 
in Estonia92. Delfi opened a forum just below the article for readers to comment and give 
personal opinions about this report. An individual identified by the Court as ‘L” was 
member of the board of the above mentioned company. Some of the comments that users 
posted on Delfi’s page were personal comments about “L” with a particularly offensive 
tone93. On 9 March 2006 L’s lawyers requested Delfi to remove the comments and claimed 
approximately 32,000 euros in compensation for non-pecuniary damages. This was on the 
basis of a believed breach of Article 8 of the Convention94. Delfi complained that holding 
it liable for the comments posted by the readers of its Internet news portal infringed its 
freedom of expression as provided for in Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights95.  Delfi argued that “it was sufficient for a host to 
expeditiously remove third-party content as soon as it became aware of its illegal nature”96.  
 
  
89 Delfi AS v Estonia, above n 71. 
90 At [11]. 
91 At [16]. 
92 At [16] 
93 “Wonder whether [L.] won’t be knocked down in Saaremaa? screwing one’s own folk like that”; “[little L.] 
go and drown yourself”: At [18] 
94 European Convention on Human Rights, above n 65, Article 8: “Right to respect for private and family life 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. 
95 At [59] 
96 At [67] 
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The Grand Chamber (European Court of Human Rights) noted the novelty of the case, being 
the “first case in which the Court has been called upon to examine a complaint of this type 
in an evolving field of technological innovation”97. The court also considered that because 
of the particular nature of the internet an internet news portal may differ to some degree 
from those of a traditional publisher, as regards third-party content98. However by using the 
following reasoning, the Chamber found that Delfi was liable for defamation: 
Diagram 9: Liability of an Online News Portal for third parties comments Delfi As v 
Estonia. 
 
  
97 At [111] 
98 At [113] 
Freedom of expression was lawfully restricted because the test was met
The Court notes that it was not in dispute 
between the parties that the applicant 
company’s freedom of expression guaranteed 
under Article 10 of the Convention had been 
interfered with by the domestic courts’ 
decisions [111]
The test requires that the restriction be lawful, 
achieve a legitimate aim and be necessary in a 
democratic society. 
Delfi is a professional ISI. 
It is a large professionally managed Internet news portal, run on a commercial basis which 
publishes news articles of its own and invited its readers to comment on them. [115]. The Chamber 
distinguished between a professional Participative Networked Platform and a "private person 
running the website or a blog as a hobby" [116]
Unlawfulness
of the comments
The posted Comments degraded “human dignity” and were “clearly unlawful”.[111] In this case 
the Chamber found that the comments were not only defamatory but constituted "hate speech and 
speech inciting violence" [110]
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In several respects this decision set a deeply concerning precedent for freedom of 
expression. “It also displays a worrying lack of understanding of the issues surrounding 
intermediary liability and the way in which the Internet works”99.  It restricts freedom of 
expression because it imposes on Participative Networked Platforms Hosts the active role 
of monitoring and taking down if necessary any content on the basis of preventing hateful 
speech. The foreseeable consequence of this case is that news portals will likely remove 
completely their comment spaces because of the fear of facing liability for third parties 
content. If that happens users will lose a valuable way of engaging in matters of public 
debate and it will lead to an increase in private censorship. 
 
2 New Zealand Case Law.  
(b) O’Brian v Brown100. 
 
The case O’Brian v Brown addressed by the “District Court found that a publication on the 
internet is a publication for the purposes of the New Zealand Defamation Act”101, meaning 
that the intermediaries involved may be publishers.  A fundamental principle of defamation 
law is that liability for publishing prima facie applies to any entity which has played a part 
in disseminating defamatory material102, therefore Micro-Gatekeepers would be liable as 
publishers. 
(c) Wishart v Murray103. 
 
In this case, Courtney J explained that they are not passive instruments or mere conduits of 
content posted on their Facebook page. They are the publishers of postings made by users 
in two circumstances:  
  
99 Article19 "European Court strikes serious blow to free speech online" (2015) Article19 
<www.article19.org>. 
100 O’Brien v Brown [2001] DCR 1065. 
101 Corbett, above n 36, at 1. 
102 At 2. 
103 “The facts of the case were that the plaintiff Ian Wishart a well-known journalist and writer wrote a book 
about the story of Macsyna King accused of murdering her new born twins. Although the father Chris Kahui, 
was acquitted of their murder he suggested that the babies' mother, had inflicted the fatal injuries. Mr Murray, 
created a Facebook page called "Boycott the Macsyna King Book" where individuals uploaded comments 
expressing their disagreements with the book. Regarding liability of Facebook Pages Hosts for third parties 
content”: Wishart v Murray [2013] NZHC 540, [2013] 3 NZLR 246.  
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a. The “Actually know Test”104 If the Facebook Page Host knows of the defamatory 
statement and fails to remove it within a reasonable time in circumstances that give 
rise to an inference then they are therefore responsible for the content.  
b. The “Ought to know test” a request by the person affected is not necessary. The 
Facebook Page Host does not know of the defamatory posting but ought to have, in 
the circumstances, to know that postings are being made that are likely to be 
defamatory. 
 
During this case various analogies were applied by Courney J in order to establish the 
liability regime of a Facebook Page Host, the one which she applied to reach the conclusion 
of Mr Murray’s liability was the analogy of the vendor: Courtney J applied an  analogy 
based on Emmens v Pottle105“This case concerned a claim for defamation against news 
vendors who had sold copies of a magazine containing a defamatory statement about the 
appellant”106  Courtney J applied it to conclude that “the absence of actual knowledge does 
not prevent a person who, prima facie, publishes a defamatory statement from being liable. 
Hence Mr Murray (seen as a vendor) “ought to know” about the offensive third party 
comments and was liable for it.  
(d) Murray v Wishart107. 
 
In the appeal, NZCA did not agree and concluded that Emmens v Pottle108 was not an 
appropriate analogy for the Host of the Facebook page. The NZCA analyses:  
 
The news vendor is a publisher only because of the role taken in distributing the 
primary vehicle of publication, the newspaper itself. This contrasts with the host of a 
Facebook page which is providing the actual medium of publication, and whose role 
in the publication is completed before publication occurs.109 
  
104 This test were baptized in the appeal by the NZCA in Murray v Wishart [2014] NZLR 722 at [98]. 
105 Emmens v Pottle (1885) 16 QBD 354 (CA). 
106 Murray v Wishart, above n 104, at [98]. 
107 at [98]. 
108 Emmens v Pottle above 105. 
109 Additionally the NZCA held that Emmens v Pottle “is authority for the proposition that a news vendor who 
does not know of the defamatory statement in a paper he or she sells is a publisher, and must rely on the 
innocent dissemination defence to avoid liability. So a decision that the host of a Facebook page could be 
liable for statements appearing on the page of which he or she is not aware would not necessarily be an 
unprecedented situation (…) the news vendor is a publisher only because of the role taken in distributing the 
30                                                                    LIABILITY OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES: 
Participative Networking Platforms and Harmful Content 
 
 
NZCA concluded that the ‘actual knowledge’ test should to be employed in that particular 
situation.110 This means that a Facebook page host would be liable only if it had ‘actual 
knowledge’ of the offensive content and fails to remove these posts within a reasonable 
time111. 
 
The actual knowledge test is aligned with the introduction of the HDCA - section 24 which 
imposes liability for an internet host who has actual knowledge of defamatory material and 
fails to remove it.  The HDCA does not differentiate between micro-keepers and Macro-
Keepers, therefore is feasible to say that s24 is applicable for a host of Facebook pages or 
administrators of a website among others. The ‘actual knowledge’ test is also consistent 
with the protection of freedom of expression because hosts of pages will be less pressured 
to take down content for the fear of legal consequences.  
(e) Karam v Parker112 
 
Joe Karam, sued Mr Parker and a Mr Purkiss for numerous statements published online 
about the trial of David Bain. This claim arose from comments on a Facebook page, on a 
website called ‘Counterspin’, Trademe and Youtube. Mr Parker denied being the publisher 
of statements by third parties, relying on the defence of innocent dissemination under s 21 
of the Defamation Act 1992 applicable to Vendors. Interestingly Courtney J who applied 
the vendor’s analogy in Wishart v Murray held in Karam v Parker that those who host 
Facebook pages or similar sites are to be regarded as publishers of postings made by others 
in two circumstances. She decided to apply first the test of “the actual knowledge” of 
harmful content by quoting herself when explaining this test. “The first is if they know of 
the defamatory material and do not remove it within a reasonable time in circumstances that 
give rise to an inference that they are taking responsibility for it”.  
 
The different outcome in the two cases with similar factual aspects creates an uncertainty 
about the liability system applicable to Micro-Gatekeepers. Moreover, if the Facebook Page 
Host is not a vendor, the exception of liability for innocent dissemination does not apply. It 
is urgent that legal sources reach unanimity on this regard. There is also the question of the 
  
primary vehicle of publication, the newspaper itself. This contrasts with the host of a Facebook page which 
is providing the actual medium of publication”:  Murray v Wishart , above n 104, at [128]. 
110 Murray v Wishart, above n 104, [144]  
111 Murray v Wishart, above n 104, [145-147] 
112 Karam v Parker [2014] NZHC 737 
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high award to the plaintiff in this case ($530,000)113. Leaving aside the reproachable 
conduct of Mr Parker, the question that arises is if this amount of money is a proportionate 
sanction for administrating an opinion group over the Internet. This kind of punitive 
outcome is very detrimental for the freedom of speech.  
 
IV Conclusions 
 
The collaboration of Authority Gatekeepers is essential for governments to deter harmful 
digital communications on the Internet. This is because authors of the speech are not easily 
detectable in cyber space and the traditional liability system is no longer effective in this 
context. It is understandable then that legal sources have turned their attention to regulate 
noticeable gatekeepers on the Internet (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) for third party 
content as they are the only visible contributors to exercise control over.   However, in order 
to safeguard freedom of expression rigid systems of liability for these intermediaries should 
be formulated.  
 
This paper explored two important frameworks for their contribution to Internet 
Intermediaries liability. The Harmful Digital Act 2015 in New Zealand, has taken a step 
forward towards recognising the Safe harbour for online hosts. By enacting this act the 
legislator is acknowledging Safe harbours as indispensable to reach a balance between 
freedom of expression and other rights on the Internet. Having said that, The E-commerce 
Directive in Europe which recognizes limitations to ISIs’ liability by differentiating 
between these entities is perhaps a greater step towards more accurate legislation. 
 
 Nevertheless, there is a lot of work to do regarding the conceptual foundation of both 
legislations because as explained, the difference between Intermediaries on the internet is 
far from being moot and so far neither of them makes an entirely accurate differentiation. 
The distinction between Authority gatekeepers and Micro-Gatekeepers must be 
implemented in any framework that deals with the liability of an online host. Authority 
gatekeepers are big corporations that have all the legal and economic machinery to address 
their responsibility for third parties communications, whereas Micro-Gatekeepers could be 
any individual that decides to open a space for sharing opinions.  
 
  
113Jared Savage “Karam awarded $535,000 over defamation” The New Zealand Herald (Online ed, Auckland, 
17 april 2014)  <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11239379> 
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This categorization should not be only be implemented in legislation but in case law also. 
As studied in cases like Delfi v Estonia the Court failed to apply correctly the E-commerce 
directive and understand the role of Participative Networked Platforms as gatekeepers to 
the exercise of freedom of expression. The Court also emphasizes continually that the 
applicant company was a newspapers operator and a professional ISI rather than, for 
example, an individual blogger moderating a blog for a hobby.  In the end the Court sent 
two contradictory messages in the sense that one is a progress and the second is a 
misinterpretation. The first that in order to protect freedom of expression and others rights 
the differentiations between ISIs should be made. And the second, that a newspapers 
platform would be prima facie liable if they do not remove hateful speech. This last one, 
basically overrides the provisions in the E-commerce directive.   
 
Cases like Wishart v Murray prove that legal sources are not yet prepared to recognize 
Micro-Gatekeepers as a new special agent in the chain of communication. Possibly even 
more concerning is the fact that in the case of Karam v Parker the host of a Facebook page 
was liable to pay $530,000 for his opinion on the Internet. This may send the wrong message 
to society that it is better to stay away from spaces of discussion on the Internet and could 
also lead to undesirable censorship. Lastly, it is pertinent to cite Stephen Todd who wrote 
that “…as regards the internet, a uniform approach remains elusive … It would appear that 
presumptions do not work well in relation to the Internet and the factual matrix and policy 
concerns will feature strongly in these cases”114 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
114 Stephen Todd The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2013) at [16.5.02].  
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